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I. INTRODUCTION
Disputes over a testamentary instrument, whether between beneficiaries
or between beneficiaries and executors, can be some of the most vicious,
expensive, and time-consuming disputes in any area of law. The emotional
nature of testamentary disputes, which typically involve family members or
other close relations, prompted testators and their attorneys to try to devise
ways to minimize the emotional impact of such disputes. Arbitration is an
effective way to minimize the impact of any dispute; however, courts both in
the United States and abroad have mixed opinions on the enforceability of
such agreements to arbitrate.1
The primary dispute regarding enforceability is the issue of weighing the
rights of the beneficiaries against the intent of the testator.2 One side of the
argument is that beneficiaries, being non-signatory third parties to the
testamentary instrument, should not be bound to give up their right to a day
in court in order to receive their bequest.3 Standard contract principles, such
as the necessity of consideration to form a binding contract, are the basis for
this argument.4
Unfortunately, courts have consistently held that
testamentary instruments are not contracts,5 and therefore the doctrine of
separability should not apply.6 On the other hand, proponents of enforcing

1 Compare In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), In re Jacobovitz’s Will,
295 N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968), In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App.
Div. 1981), Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004), and In re Calomiris,
894 A.2d 408 (D.C. 2006) (these courts reached the decision that an otherwise valid
arbitration clause in a testamentary instrument was unenforceable), with In re Johnson, 127
N.W. 133 (Neb. 1910); Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013), In re Kalikow, 872
N.Y.S.2d 511 (App. Div. 2009), and In re Estate of Heiney, No. 1 CA-CV12-0456, 2013 WL
1846599 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013) (these courts ruled in favor of enforceability, and the court in
Heiney overturned the ruling in Schoneberger based on legislation enacted specifically stating
testamentary arbitration clauses are enforceable).
2
Erin Katzen, Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: Defining the Parameters for
Mandatory Arbitration of Wills and Trusts, 24 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 118, 121–24 (2011).
3
See David Horton, The Federal Arbitration Act and Testamentary Instruments, 90 N.C.
L. REV. 1027, 1075–76 (2012) (stating that a beneficiary’s choice to receive their bequest is
sufficient to satisfy the consideration requirement of standard contract law, and that by
disclaiming their bequest beneficiaries can demonstrate a lack of consent to arbitration, but
implying that beneficiaries should not have to make this choice in order to avoid arbitration).
4 See generally Horton, supra note 3.
5
Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083; Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409.
6 See Horton, supra note 3, at 1082–86 (discussing the difficulties of applying the doctrine
of separability to probate law, and discussing the arguments against applying separability
doctrine even in contract law).
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these clauses argue that the intent of the testator, without whom the
beneficiaries would receive nothing, should govern.7 Those in favor of
enforcement counter this argument by simply stating that the receipt of
benefits is sufficient consideration to bind the beneficiaries.8
This ambiguity in the law led legal theorists and organizations to draft
model clauses that attempt to maximize the enforceability of arbitration
agreements in testamentary instruments. In the United States, the enactment
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which requires courts to honor valid
agreements to arbitrate,9 and the establishment of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), which drafts arbitration rules and model clauses that
parties may opt to include in contracts, have combined to usher in a period in
which the enforceability of arbitration agreements in almost all areas of law,
excluding testamentary disputes, is at its broadest.10
While the current state of arbitration law in the United States is both
interesting and dynamic, the more relevant question for this Note is the
enforceability of arbitration agreements included in testamentary instruments
outside of the United States. While the United States has the FAA, there is
no similarly binding authority on foreign nations.11 In order to promote
uniformity in the international setting, the International Chamber of

7 See S.I. Strong, Empowering Settlors: How Proper Language Can Increase the
Enforceability of a Mandatory Arbitration Provision in a Trust, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J.
275, 294–95 (2012) (discussing how settlor/testator intent in including the arbitration
agreement in the testamentary instrument is something one would not expect to see
challenged, but is often what is at issue in disputes over the capacity of the testator and
validity of the testamentary instrument on the whole); see also Stephen Wills Murphy,
Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 627, 652–58 (2011) (discussing and critiquing the “Intent Theory” of enforcing
arbitration in wills and trusts, stating that outside of arbitration agreements the intent of the
donor almost always controls).
8 Horton, supra note 3.
9
See Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
10 Janet Lee Herold, Federal Preemption—Arbitration—Federal Arbitration Act Creates
National Substantive Law Applicable in Federal and State Courts and Supercedes Contrary
State Statutes, 54 MISS. L.J. 571, 583 (1984) (“[S]tates with arbitration statutes of narrower
scope than the federal Act must disregard their own law and apply the federal law in state
court actions. Uniform application of the Act prevents forum shopping by establishing the
federal law as controlling in both state and federal courts. Such uniformity promotes the
legislative intent of encouraging arbitration since the Act favors arbitration agreements.”).
11
The Council for Europe drafted and proposed a “European Convention Providing a
Uniform Law on Arbitration” in 1966. This convention was ratified by a grand total of one
nation. See European Convention Providing a Uniform Law on Arbitration, Jan. 20, 1966,
C.E.T.S. No. 056.
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Commerce (ICC) created a task force to draft model arbitration rules and
clauses, similar to those of the AAA, for use in international contracts.12
The ICC’s 2012 revision of its arbitration rules addressed several of the
most glaring problems, particularly regarding the arbitration of ubiquitous
multi-party disputes.13 Unfortunately, another problem has arisen since the
revision: did the drafters of the model clause intend the clause to function
solely under the rules it was designed under, or did they intend the clause to
incorporate revisions to the rules going forward?
In order to answer this question, two other questions must be answered in
turn. First, what were the goals of the 1998 ICC Rules and the 2006 Model
Clause? Second, what was the intent of the drafters of the 2006 Model
Clause?
After answering the question of whether the 2006 Model Clause should
now operate under the 2012 Rules, a determination of whether the rules
revision has affected the overall enforceability of the 2006 Clause can be
made.
The subsequent sections begin with the differences between the 1998 and
2012 Rules, then discuss whether these changes promote or diminish the
potential enforceability of the Model Clause based on the reasoning of courts
that heard these disputes in the recent past.
II. BACKGROUND
In 1996, the ICC created a task force to revise the ICC’s uniform set of
rules used to govern arbitration agreements, particularly in the international
arena. After two years the task force published the culmination of their
work.14 The result was the 1998 ICC Model Arbitration Rules. The drafters
envisaged these rules to govern a variety of arbitration agreements, but they
designed the rules with commercial arbitration foremost in mind.15
12 See Commission on Arbitration and ADR, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
http://www.iccwbo.org/about-icc/policy-commissions/arbitration/ (last visited July 3, 2014)
(highlighting specific goals of the ICC with regard to arbitration).
13 Compare RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (1998)
[hereinafter 1998 RULES], with RULES OF ARBITRATION OF THE INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
(2012) [hereinafter 2012 RULES] (specifically compare article 10 of the 1998 Rules with
articles 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the 2012 Rules).
14
1998 RULES, supra note 13.
15 Id. art. 1 (“The function of the Court is to provide for the settlement by arbitration of
business disputes of an international character in accordance with the Rules of Arbitration of
the International Chamber of Commerce (the ‘Rules’). If so empowered by an arbitration
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With the evolution of testamentary arbitration in recent years, the ICC felt
the need to draft a specific Model Clause for Trust Disputes in order to
homogenize and incorporate such disputes into the sphere of their arbitration
system.16 This clause was published in 2006 and was designed to function
under the 1998 ICC Rules.17 Unfortunately, the 1998 Rules contained
certain provisions that created hurdles to uniform enforceability.18
A. Goals of the 1998 Rules and the Drafters’ Intent
It is apparent that the primary goal of both the arbitration task force,
which produced the 1998 Rules, and the ICC in commissioning the task force
was to investigate the potential for uniform arbitral enforcement and to draft
a set of rules furthering this goal.19 Outside of testamentary disputes, the
success of the ICC Arbitration Rules is unquestionable.20 However, at the
time the 1998 Rules were drafted, the ICC was not yet contemplating
applying those rules to testamentary disputes because the legal trend at that
time was to consider such clauses unenforceable.21

agreement, the Court shall also provide for the settlement by arbitration in accordance with
these Rules of business disputes not of an international character.”).
16 Bruno W. Boesch, The ICC Initiative, 18 TRUSTS & TRUSTEES 316, 316 (2012) (“There
was, at the time, as little surprise at the lack of interest hitherto in the resolution of trust
disputes by way of arbitration as there was at the desire to remedy this and to expand the ever
growing province of arbitration.”).
17
Id. at 317.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 The International Court of Arbitration, the ICC’s division that actually oversees and
administrates requests for arbitration made to the ICC, has heard over 20,000 disputes involving
parties and arbitrators from over 200 countries. See Statistics, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/Products-and-Services/Arbitration-and-ADR/Arbitration/Int
roduction-to-ICC-Arbitration/Statistics/ (last visited July 3, 2014).
21
See In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936), In re Jacobovitz’s Will, 295
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968), In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div.
1981) (highlighting nearly 100 years of American jurisprudence on the unenforceability of
arbitration clauses in testamentary instruments); see also Boesch, supra note 16, at 318
(“Inasmuch as the reservation of trust litigation practitioners went to the arbitrability of trust
disputes, it was noted, however, that other issues had been deemed not arbitrable in the past,
yet over time arbitration had gained recognition there too, to wit, labour and, more
interestingly, competition. The idea of ‘ousting the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts’ in itself
did not seem anathema to the working group.”).
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It is equally obvious that the 1998 Rules were intended to govern all the
Model Arbitration Clauses that the ICC drafted.22 The drafters’ intent,23 as
well as that of the ICC as a whole, was to create uniform enforceability, and
to firmly and definitively provide binding rules that would provide final and
binding judgments in arbitration agreements across a broad array of legal
situations.24
B. The 2006 Model Clause: Scope and Goals
The goal of the drafters of the original rules and of the other Model
Clauses was to provide a framework for arbitration agreements that would be
universally enforceable. This was also the aim of the drafters of the 2006
Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes.25 The real question lies in
whether the drafters intended the 2006 Model Clause to operate solely based
on the 1998 Rules, or to incorporate future rule revisions into its
functionality. Ultimately, it is clear that the drafters did indeed intend the
Clause to function under revised rules. Beyond the nonsensical argument
that the drafters meant the Clause to forever function on an outdated version
of the rules, the drafters’ own words support the determination that the
Clause was meant to operate under the modified rules.26
In a letter to the national committees that appointed the task force
members, the ICC task force conveyed the points that they had to come to

22 See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(1) (“Where the parties have agreed to submit to
arbitration under the Rules, they shall be deemed to have submitted ipso facto to the Rules in
effect on the date of commencement of the arbitration proceedings, unless they have agreed to
submit to the Rules in effect on the date of their arbitration agreement.”) (implying that all
agreements to arbitrate under the ICC Rules, whether via an ICC Model Clause or otherwise,
will be governed by the Rules. Each Model Clause specifically states that the agreement is
subject to the ICC Rules of Arbitration.).
23
Id.; Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://
www.iccwbo.org/products-and-services/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/standard-icc-arbitration-cl
auses/ (last visited July 3, 2014) (indicating that the drafters of the Model Clauses intended them
to function under the ICC Rules based on the wording of the clauses, as “all disputes arising out
of or in connection with the present contract shall be finally settled under the Rules of Arbitration
of the International Chamber of Commerce . . .”).
24
See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 28(6) (“Every Award shall be binding on the parties.
By submitting the dispute to arbitration under these Rules, the parties undertake to carry out
any Award without delay and shall be deemed to have waived their right to any form of
recourse insofar as such waiver can validly be made.”).
25
1998 RULES, supra note 13; Standard ICC Arbitration Clauses, supra note 23.
26 Boesch, supra note 16, at 317.
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unanimous agreement on.27 Specifically, the task force told the committees
they had agreed on “the appropriateness of the ICC rules, with no need to
adopt specific new arbitration rules” in order to accommodate a Model
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes.28
Determining the goals and scope of the 2006 Clause is more complicated.
It is clear that the ICC and its task force were of the opinion that, if it was
workable, arbitration of testamentary disputes would become “if not the
preferred avenue of resolution . . . a sound alternative.”29 The thought was
that if the ICC could create a working framework—the Rules—and a viable
way to apply them—the Model Clause—the desirability of arbitrating
testamentary disputes would cause a shift towards general enforceability
because those jurisdictions that held on to the antiquated principle of general
unenforceability would not want to “lose their appeal.”30
Jurisdictions gain a surprising amount of revenue from having
testamentary instruments devised within them, mostly arising from estate
taxes and other fees imposed on both the estates and the beneficiaries as the
price of doing business, so to speak, within a jurisdiction’s borders.31 The
amount of monetary value generated from both cash transfers and asset
transfers that occur as a result of testamentary bequests is staggering. For
instance, France saw as much as $196,503,920 in taxable assets bequeathed
in 2011.32

27

Id.
Id.
29
Id. at 321.
30
Id.
31 See
Revenue Statistics, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx (enter “revenue statistics” in the “find in
themes” search box; follow “Comparative Tables” hyperlink on the left side of the screen;
select “estate and inheritance taxes” in the “tax” dropdown bar and “tax revenue as % of total
revenue” in the variable dropdown bar) (last updated Oct. 2, 2013, 4:49 PM) (showing that
most European nations receive between 0.5% and 0.8% of their tax revenue from estate and
inheritance taxes, with Belgium receiving 1.3% of their $226,456,400 total tax revenue from
estate and inheritance taxes in 2011. That is almost $3 million in revenue solely from estate
and inheritance taxes.).
32 Id. (France receives 0.8% of their total tax revenue from inheritance and estate taxes, a
total of $9,825,196 in 2011); ERNST & YOUNG GLOBAL LIMITED, INTERNATIONAL ESTATE AND
INHERITANCE TAX GUIDE 92 (2013), available at http:// www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAsset
s/2013-international-estate-and-inheritance-tax-guide/$FILE/2013-international-estate-and-inh
eritance-tax-guide.pdf (France’s inheritance tax rates are scaled based on the amount of the
bequest, ranging from 5% for bequests of less than €8,072 to 45% for bequests of more than
€1,805,677. The $196 million high mark for bequests is based on assuming all transfers were
28
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While it is unlikely that there is any nation where a significant portion of
the government’s tax revenue comes solely from estate taxes,33 the amount at
stake is still enough to make legislators think twice before ignoring the
progression of estate law towards the enforceability of arbitration agreements
in testamentary disputes.34
The scope of the 2006 Model Clause is more difficult to determine. Up to
this point, the ICC Rules and the International Court of Arbitration (ICC
Court) were designed primarily for commercial arbitration,35 and thus
contained provisions that made their application across different areas of law
difficult.36 Therefore, when the Model Clause was published in 2006, the
rules it operated under did not necessarily contemplate their own
applicability to estate law.37 This was a major obstacle that stood in the way
of the uniform enforceability that the ICC aimed for, and resulted in several
jurisdictions declining to enforce the Model Clause for Trust Disputes
despite enforcing other arbitration clauses that operated under the 1998 ICC
Rules.38
It is clear the Model Clause was intended to cover testamentary disputes.
Otherwise, there would not be a separate and distinct clause for trusts.
However, the 1998 version of the Rules, under which the Model Clause was
designed to operate, were not designed with that subject matter in mind.39
This all changed, however, with the 2012 revision. The revision has “done
away with any restriction of the use of the ICC institutional arbitration

taxed at 5%, though this is astronomically unlikely. The actual value of assets transferred in
France in 2011 is assuredly lower, but must still be very high.).
33
See Revenue Statistics, supra note 31.
34 See Boesch, supra note 16, at 316 (stating that the nation which spearheaded the
initiative to create the ICC task force to draft the Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes
was France); see also Revenue Statistics, supra note 31 (showing that France has one of the
highest percentages of its national tax revenue coming from inheritance and estate taxes at
0.8%).
35 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (stating explicitly that they were designed “for the
settlement by arbitration . . . of business disputes not of an international character” (emphasis
added)).
36 Boesch, supra note 16.
37 1998 RULES, supra note 13.
38
See R. Doak Bishop, Drafting the ICC Arbitral Clause, KING & SPALDING 17, http://
www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop5.pdf; see also ICC Germany, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE, http://www.iccwbo.org/worldwide-membership/national-committees/icc-germany/
(last visited Oct. 24, 2013); OLG Karlsruhe, NJW 688.
39
Unlike the 2012 Rules, the 1998 Rules do not contain a clause for trusts or testamentary
disputes. See 1998 RULES, supra note 13.

2015]

CHANGING THE GAME

675

system to mere commercial disputes.”40 This leads us to the most important
question in determining the effect the 2012 revision of the Rules will have on
the general enforceability of the 2006 Model Clause: what are the differences
between the 1998 and 2012 rules?
C. Substantive Differences from the 2012 Revision
It is unclear whether the 2012 revision of the Rules will be interpreted as
providing substantive changes that will affect the enforceability of the Model
Clause or simply providing inconsequential changes that will have no impact
on the Model Clause. At least with regard to their effect on the Model
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, it seems clear that the changes are not
simply inconsequential as major changes were made to provisions of the
Rules regarding multi-party arbitration,41 the consolidation of multiple
claims,42 the disclosure obligations of the arbitrator,43 confidentiality
requirements,44 and the scope and validity of the Rules as a whole.45

40

Boesch, supra note 16, at 317 & n.4 (citing 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 2(4)).
Compare 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7 (articulating the framework for the joinder of
additional parties to a request for arbitration), with 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10 (making
no mention of “multiple parties” outside of discussing the rules for appointing arbitrators
when multiple parties are involved).
42 The 1998 Rules only mention additional claims and the consolidation of claims when
discussing the rules for appointing arbitrators when there are multiple parties or claims
between them. The 2012 Rules contain provisions that deal specifically with the
consolidation of claims and claims between parties. Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art.
10, with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 8.
43 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(i)–(2) (requiring arbitrators to disclose any
conflicts that would bring the “independence” of the arbitrator from the parties and dispute
into question), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(1)–(2) (requiring arbitrators to remain
“impartial and independent” from the parties and the dispute, and requiring disclosure of
anything that would call their impartiality or independence into question (emphasis added)).
44 The 1998 Rules have no specific provision dealing with the confidentiality of any arbitral
proceeding or reward, implying that the arbitral tribunal may take sua sponte action to keep
the proceedings confidential. See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(7). But see 2012 RULES,
supra note 13, art. 22(3) (authorizing the arbitral tribunal to “make orders concerning the
confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings” upon the request of a party, but reserving the
tribunals right to make such orders of their own accord).
45 Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (“The function of the [ICC] Court is to
provide for settlement by arbitration of [international] business disputes . . . .” (emphasis
added)), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(2) (“[The ICC Court] administers resolution
of disputes by arbitral tribunals in accordance with the [ICC Rules]. The Court is the only
body authorized to administer arbitrations under the [ICC] Rules.” (emphasis added)).
41
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1. Multi-Party Disputes
Where the 1998 Rules gave scant attention to the issue of multi-party
arbitration, mainly dealing with the approval and appointment of the
arbitrators but leaving the issue of joinder of additional parties vague,46 the
2012 revision provides a much more detailed framework for proceeding with
arbitration involving multiple parties.47
Specifically, the 2012 Rules allow for the unilateral joinder of additional
parties to an arbitration proceeding before an arbitrator is appointed, and
with the consent of all parties involved, after the arbitrator’s appointment.48
This may be the most important change to the ICC Rules for the purposes of
enforcing the Model Clause; the ambiguity in the prior Rules about the
ability to join additional parties is one the greatest obstacles in the way of
general enforceability. Considering that the majority of trust disputes
involve multiple parties, some who may be amenable to the disposition of
assets and some who may not, the ability to join additional parties is crucial
to fair and efficient, and therefore desirable, testamentary arbitration.
2. Joinder of Claims
The revised Rules also provide a significantly more defined framework
for the joinder of additional claims.49 The new rules allow parties, if there
are more than two, to assert any additional claims they have against the other
parties.50 This is a major change from the 1998 Rules, which did not
contemplate the assertion of claims between multiple parties to an arbitration
proceeding outside of the assertion of counterclaims in the answer.51
This is a necessary function if the 2012 Rules are to increase the efficacy
and enforceability of the 2006 Model Clause,52 as trust disputes are often
complex in terms of both the number of parties involved as well as the
claims each party has against each other. For any arbitral award to be
meaningful, parties must be able to bring all of their grievances to the table.
If not all aspects of a dispute can be resolved during arbitration, it seems
46

1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10.
2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7.
48
Id.
49 Id. arts. 5(5), 8.
50
Id. art. 8.
51 See 1998 RULES, supra note 13, arts. 5(5), 10 (making no mention of additional claims
outside of the counter-claims asserted in the answer).
52 See Boesch, supra note 16, at 316–17.
47
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intuitive that those unresolved issues could surface again, potentially leading
to a challenge of the arbitral award. The possibility of such challenges
directly contradicts the goals of efficiency and finality set forth by the ICC.53
This problem is acute in the context of trust disputes and was compounded
under the 1998 Rules.
3. Disclosure
Ethical and professional codes and standards of conduct are prevalent in
most professions, even more so in the legal profession.54 Arbitrators, both
domestic and international, are bound by ethical and professional codes and
standards of conduct just as any attorney or judge.55 Under the 2012 Rules,
arbitrators must now disclose any conflicts of interest, or any other ethical
dilemma they might have, to all parties involved.56
While the issue of disclosure by the arbitrator seems like it would only be
minor given the ethical responsibilities imposed on them by their profession,
it is in fact quite troublesome in testamentary arbitration. In commercial
arbitration, the arbitrator is often a third party either chosen by the parties
from a list provided by the ICC or appointed by the ICC itself.57 Conversely,
many arbitrators in testamentary disputes are known to either one or more
53

See Commission on Arbitration and ADR, supra note 12.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2013),
available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct/model_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents.ht
ml; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (2011), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA
_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics.
55 ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra note 54; INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLES ON CONDUCT FOR THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 54; AMERICAN ARBITRATION
ASSOCIATION, THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (2004),
available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeld=%2FUCM%2FADRSTG_003867
&revision=latestreleased; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA GUIDELINES ON CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Publicatio
ns/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics.
56
Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(1)–(2), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art.
11(1)–(2). Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(1), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13,
art. 14(1).
57
See 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 13(3)–(4) (stating that the ICC Court will appoint
arbitrators upon the proposal of an ICC national committee if the proposal is deemed
“appropriate,” or directly when one or more party to the arbitration is “a state or claims to be a
state entity”); see also 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 9 (stating essentially the same as
above, but restricting the circumstances under which the ICC Court may directly appoint an
arbitrator).
54
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parties, and can potentially be the executor of the estate when the parties in
conflict are all beneficiaries.58
The ICC addressed issues that arise fairly frequently in testamentary
disputes relating to disclosure in its 2012 revision of the Rules. Most
importantly, the 2012 revision addressed the grounds upon which parties
may challenge an otherwise duly appointed arbitrator.59 In the 1998 version
of the ICC’s Rules, all that an arbitrator was required to do was “be and
remain independent of the parties” and “sign a statement of independence
and disclose in writing . . . any facts or circumstances which might . . . call
into question [his] independence.”60 The limitation of the requirement to
“independence” was criticized as not being in line with many other
arbitration organizations.61 Criticism also came, despite the aforementioned
professional code of ethics, because the “independence” requirement caused
discomfort among potential parties to arbitration.62 While an arbitrator may
indeed be independent from any of the parties, that is not necessarily
indicative of his impartiality. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “impartial” as
“[u]nbiased”63 or “[d]isinterested,”64 and defines “independent” as “[n]ot
subject to the control or influence of another”65 and “[n]ot associated with
another (often larger) entity.”66 It is plain that there is a fairly significant
distinction between the terms in how they relate to arbitrators. An
“independent” arbitrator need only be outside the control or influence of the
58 See 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3) (showing that the 1998 Rules require parties to
include “all relevant particulars [regarding] the number of arbitrators and their choice . . . and
any nomination of an arbitrator . . .” where the 2012 Rules allow for “all relevant particulars
and any observations or proposals . . .” (emphasis added)).
59
Id. art. 11(1).
60 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 7(1)–(2).
61 See Richard Power, Briefing Note on ICC Rule Changes, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG
(Oct. 6, 2011), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/10/06/briefing-note-on-icc-rule-ch
anges/.
62
See Ben Giaretta & Ronnie King, Independence, Impartiality and Challenging the
Appointment of an Arbitrator, in INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 26, 27 (2005) (discussing the effect bias on the part of the
arbitrator has on the parties, stating that “it is of vital importance that confidence and trust in the
tribunal’s ability to act fairly is established and maintained”), available at http://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCkQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.ashurst.com%2Fpage.aspx%3Fid_content%3D1538&ei=pylpUr7BFIu-kQfwx4CQAQ
&usg=AFQjCNGjKEUjb75ZyVHnGclXwdEJMdZt2w& bvm=bv.55123115,d.eW0.
63
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (10th ed. 2014).
64 Id.
65
Id. at 887.
66 Id.
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parties, thus requiring arbitrators only to be independent does not prevent
them from harboring internal biases toward either party. Requiring
arbitrators to affirm that they are both independent, not under the control of
either party, and impartial, without bias towards either party, is firmly in line
with the interests of fairness.
The drafters of the 2012 Rules, however, seem to have made an attempt
to minimize the challenges to arbitrator nominations by fostering confidence
in potential parties to arbitration proceedings that the arbitrators will be fair.
Specifically, the drafters included a provision in the 2012 Rules requiring the
arbitrator to “sign a statement of acceptance, availability, impartiality, and
independence” from the parties.67 The 2012 Rules also state that in addition
to the disclosure of any facts or circumstances that could call the arbitrators
independence into question, the arbitrators must also disclose “any
circumstances that could give rise to reasonable doubts as to [his]
impartiality.”68
Realistically, it seems unlikely that this change will elicit any major
change in conduct on the part of arbitrators. As a matter of common sense,
there is an assumption that the majority of arbitrators do not brazenly ignore
their own rules of professional conduct, which requires the arbitrator to
disclose any conflict of interest.69 Nevertheless, the change may serve to
increase public confidence in arbitrators given the requirement to disclose
any facts affecting impartiality in addition to independence.
4. Confidentiality Requirements
Closely tied to the issue of disclosure is the issue of confidentiality. On
the one hand, parties to arbitration are often concerned with the impartiality
of the arbitrators, and desire them to disclose any conflicts of interest that
may bias the result. On the other hand, parties to arbitration may be even
67

2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
Id.
69
See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, supra note 55, at I (laying out the ethical
obligations of the appointed arbitrators); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, RULES OF ETHICS
FOR INT’L ARBITRATORS, arts. 3–4 (1987) (discussing the ethical obligations of arbitrators
when confronted with conflicts of interest), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Defau
lt.aspx?q=rules%20of%$20ethics%20for%20international%20arbitrators&SearchOption=0&
MatchCriteria=0&MatchWholeWords=1; INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 55,
at 1–17 (discussing and laying out the framework for what is a conflict of interest, when an
arbitrator must disclose such circumstances, and the circumstances under which the parties
may “waive” the conflict of interest).
68
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more concerned with what the arbitrator might disclose to others about their
arbitration, both hearings and awards. The 2012 Rules attempt to assuage
this concern by adding a specific provision providing for measures to ensure
confidentiality.70
The ICC’s 1998 Rules do not include a specific provision dealing with the
confidentiality requirements of both arbitrators and parties during and after
an arbitration proceeding.71 Instead, they only convey a power to the arbitral
tribunal to take “measures,” sua sponte, regarding the confidentiality of the
arbitration proceedings in order to “protect[ ] trade secrets and confidential
information.”72 This change is illustrative of the drafters’ intent to broaden
the scope of the Rules. The 1998 provision, with its focus on trade secrets,73
seemingly contemplates confidentiality solely in commercial arbitration–the
intended area of application for the Rules from their inception up to the 1998
version.74
Given the ICC’s desire to expand the scope of the Rules, as evidenced by
its endeavors in the area of trust law,75 it is probable the drafters of the 2012
Rules revised the Rules with this in mind. The 2012 confidentiality
provision departs from the “business dispute” focus by allowing, in addition
to the sua sponte power of the tribunal to ensure the confidentiality of trade
secrets, for either party to the proceedings to request the tribunal to “make
orders concerning the confidentiality of the arbitration proceedings.”76 This
allows parties with solely personal or emotional reasons to desire
confidentiality to request it, and though the tribunal is not required to honor
the request77 they now have the ability to do so if they choose.
5. Overall Scope of the Rules
As has been discussed previously in this Note, the overall scope of the
ICC’s Rules for Arbitration have changed significantly as a result of the
70

2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
See generally 1998 RULES, supra note 13.
72
Id. art. 20(7).
73 Id.
74 See id. art. 1(1) (stating that the “function of the [ICC] Court is to provide for the
settlement by arbitration of business disputes of an international character in accordance with
the [ICC Rules]”).
75
See Boesch, supra note 16, at 317 (discussing ICC’s creation of and orders to the Model
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes task force).
76
2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
77 Id. (“The tribunal may, [if requested by a party], make orders . . . .” (emphasis added)).
71
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2012 Rules revisions. While this change is specifically embodied in Article
1 of the Rules,78 the changes made to other provisions throughout the Rules
also evidence the intent of the drafters to modify their scope.
The addition of provisions dealing with case management and cost
efficiency may not seem to further the goal of expanding the scope of the
Rules beyond commercial disputes, however the cost of arbitration can be
just as high as litigation when not managed properly,79 and thus can
discourage parties without the means to pursue their claims.
The arbitration of testamentary disputes does not, for the most part,
involve parties with unlimited funds who can afford to drag out the
arbitration proceedings and rack up excessive arbitration costs. One notable
exception is arbitration between the executor of the decedent’s estate and one
or more beneficiaries as executors often have the means to pay for a dragged
out arbitration proceeding while the beneficiaries cannot. Thus, beneficiaries
may be discouraged from pursuing their claims for financial reasons if the
executor is able to actively delay and unreasonably extend the proceedings.
The 2012 Rules give arbitration tribunals the power to impose procedural
requirements on the parties to ensure cost-effective management of the
proceedings.80 Additionally, the 2012 Rules impose an obligation on both
the arbitral tribunal as well as the parties to “make every effort to conduct the
arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner.”81 In order to give
these provisions some bite, and theoretically to provide more protection to
potential parties without the financial means to engage in lengthy
proceedings, the drafters of the 2012 Rules included a provision that allows
the tribunal to modify the costs to be levied on the parties based on their
conduct.82 Article 37(5) of the 2012 Rules expressly states that the tribunal
is able, as a result of their power to modify costs based on conduct, to base
their decisions on factors including the extent to which the parties have
conducted the arbitration expeditiously and cost effectively.83
78

Compare 1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1), with 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 1(1).
Where attorney fees from litigating trust disputes depend on which attorney or law firm
the parties have representing them, and thus are relatively incalculable, the AAA and
International Centre for Dispute Resolution publish fee schedules for their arbitration. These
fees are fixed in relation to the amount of the claim, and are relatively low. See International
Dispute Resolution Procedures, INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 2 (2014),
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004338.
80
2012 RULES, supra note 13, arts. 22(2), 24(1)–(2).
81 Id. art. 22(1).
82
See generally id. art. 37(5).
83 Id.
79
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To reiterate, the drafters of the 2012 Rules made headway into expanding
the scope of the Rules by modifying the confidentiality provisions of the
Rules.84 The change may seem minor, but modifying the provision that
allows the tribunal to impose measures to protect the confidentiality of
corporate, commercial, and trade secrets85 to include the confidentiality of
essentially anything, based on a party’s request,86 may actually effectuate a
large change in the volume of arbitration of non-commercial disputes under
the ICC Rules.
Testamentary disputes often involve strictly, and sometimes deeply
buried, familial issues and disputes, and no one wants their family’s
proverbial dirty laundry to be aired out to anyone and everyone. The 1998
Rules did not have a provision allowing the arbitration tribunal to impose
confidentiality requirements outside of those involving commercial or trade
secrets,87 so parties to a testamentary arbitration proceeding were unable to
request that the tribunal keep the proceedings closed and confidential. The
2012 Rules solved this issue by allowing either party to request that
measures be taken to ensure the confidentiality of nearly anything in the
proceeding.88
The 2012 revision has undeniably brought about significant substantive
changes to the ICC’s Rules, especially when approached from the point of
view of those who want to use and enforce the Model Arbitration Clause for
Trust Disputes when drafting their testamentary instrument. That these
changes have been made is, however, only part of the picture. Before the
question of whether these changes to the Rules will have an effect on the
general enforceability of the Model Clause can be answered, the state of the
law must be examined. The 2012 revision made testamentary arbitration, as
an alternative to litigation, much more attractive to parties. But this means
next to nothing if courts in the U.S. and abroad continue to refuse to enforce
agreements to arbitrate testamentary disputes.

84
See supra Part II.C.4 (explaining how the 2012 Rules were drafted to include a method to
ensure confidentiality of arbitration proceedings).
85
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(vii).
86 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(iii).
87
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 20(vii).
88 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 22(iii).
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D. The Current State of the Law
Despite the existence of the FAA, courts in the U.S. have continued
holding agreements to arbitrate testamentary disputes to be unenforceable.89
The prevailing consensus, however, has begun to shift towards enforceability
in the past few years,90 which, on the whole, seems likely to increase the
chances a testamentary instrument including the ICC’s Model Arbitration
Clause for Trust Disputes would be enforced. Unfortunately, the dominant
legal regime governing arbitration in the United States is the FAA.91
Examining the 2012 ICC Rules through the lens of the FAA may have a
significant effect on the enforceability of the Model Clause in U.S. courts,
though what that effect may be is yet to be seen.
The examination of the state of the law abroad is not as simple. With as
many legal regimes as there are sovereign nations, it would be impossible to
discuss the view on the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in
testamentary instruments of each in this Note. This section will examine the
admittedly few opinions of the courts of several nations in Europe and South
America that have taken divergent views on the issue.
As a general rule, “the law of the seat of the arbitration determines what
type of dispute is arbitrable.”92 This question can be multi-faceted, requiring
a determination of whether the type of dispute is arbitrable under the
jurisdiction’s laws as well as whether the specific issue in dispute is
arbitrable.93 In trust disputes, many times the issue in dispute is personal,
such as mental capacity or competency, or the existence of a marital or filial

89 See In re Meredith’s Estate, 266 N.W. 351 (Mich. 1936); In re Jacobovitz’s Will, 295
N.Y.S.2d 527 (Surrogate’s Ct. 1968); In re Matter of Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div.
1981) (discussing the general unenforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary
instruments based on standard contract law principles, including lack of consideration and
acceptance).
90
See Rachal v. Reitz, 403 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. 2013); In re Kalikow, 872 N.Y.S.2d 511
(App. Div. 2009); In re Heiney, No. 1 CA-CV12-0456, 2013 WL 1846599 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2013) (discussing the general enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary
instruments based on the intent of the donor, and using contract principles such as
consideration and acceptance to support enforceability).
91 Federal Arbitration Act § 2, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2013).
92
Christopher P. Koch, A Tale of Two Cities! – Arbitrating Trust Disputes and the ICC’s
Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes, in 2 YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 179,
187 (Marianne Roth & Michael Geistlinger ed., 2012).
93 Id.
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relationship between the testator and a beneficiary, and the courts of several
jurisdictions have held such disputes are non-arbitrable.94
The predominant way national governments are able to make agreements
to arbitrate testamentary disputes enforceable, whether under the ICC Rules
or otherwise, is to create a statutory regime that explicitly authorizes their
validity. This is analogous to how the FAA handles commercial disputes.
Germany, which has an ICC National Committee,95 is one such European
country that has enacted legislation dealing directly with the arbitration of
trust disputes.96 Germany’s Civil Code requires its courts to enforce
agreements to arbitrate in trust disputes and qualifies this requirement by
requiring the arbitral tribunal to be “established[ ] in a manner permissible
under statute.”97 However, this provision can be interpreted as not requiring
enforcement at all because, as German case law shows,98 establishment under
the statute involves a fact-based balancing test to determine whether or not
the issue in dispute is legally arbitrable. German courts have weighed “the
testator’s freedom to dispose of her estate against the protection that probate
law afforded heirs.”99 Accordingly, German law states that “an arbitration
clause in testamentary trust is enforceable only to the extent that the trust
deals with assets that the testator could freely dispose of.”100
Spain takes a different approach. Spain’s Arbitration Act provides that
“[a]rbitration may be validly provided for in a testamentary disposition to
resolve disputes between beneficiaries or legatees in matters relating to the

94 Id.; see In re Fellman, 604 A.2d 263, 266 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (stating that because there
are statutory protections for the rights of incompetents which provide procedural safeguards not
present in arbitration, “arbitration is not an appropriate vehicle for determining the incompetency
of an individual”); Oberlandesgericht Karlsruhe [OLG Karlsruhe][Higher Regional Court of
Karlsruhe] July 28, 2009, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [NJW] 688, 689 (Ger.), available at
https://www.jurion.de/Urteile/OLG-Karls ruhe/2009-07-28/11-WX-94_07.
95 ICC Germany, supra note 38.
96
See ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO][Code of Civil Procedure], Jan. 30, 1877,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBI.] 3202, as amended, § 1066 (Ger.) (“The stipulations of the
present Book shall apply mutatis mutandis to the arbitral tribunals established, in a manner
permissible under statute, by last wills or other rulings not based on an agreement.”).
97 Id.
98 OLG Karlsruhe, supra note 38 (the testator included in the arbitration clause that any
dispute arising from an attempt to remove the executor would be taken to arbitration. The
German court held that because the Civil Code provided an heir with the ability to petition a
probate court to remove the executor, to reserve that issue for arbitration was outside of the
testator’s powers.).
99
Koch, supra note 92, at 195.
100 Id.
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distribution or administration of the estate.”101 This provision removes the
vague “established under statute”102 language present in the German Code,
and strictly limits the scope of arbitrability to the disposition of assets.103
Several former Spanish colonies, following Spain’s lead, have adopted
similar systems to deal with testamentary arbitration within their own
courts.104
Another European nation, Malta, has taken a much more aggressive
approach to ensure the enforcement of testamentary arbitration clauses.
Malta’s Arbitration Act explicitly and strictly provides that “[i]t shall be
lawful for a settlor of a trust to insert an arbitration clause in a deed of trust
and such clause shall be binding on all trustees, protectors and any
beneficiaries under the trust in relation to matters arising under or in relation
to the trust.”105 This construction of the Act completely removes the
ambiguity present in both the Spanish Act and the German Code, and
provides an extraordinarily broad scope to enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate. Theoretically, even the issues that are deemed unarbitrable in other
European jurisdictions, like competency and mental capacity, can be subject
to arbitration under Malta’s Arbitration Act.
All of the changes from the 1998 to the 2012 Rules listed above will have
a significant effect on the enforceability of the Model Arbitration Clause for
Trust Disputes going forward. However, the formal and textual differences
between the versions of the Rules are only part of the picture. In the
following sections, this Note will discuss how and why these changes affect
the enforceability of the Model Clause.
III. DISCUSSION
The drafters of the ICC Model Arbitration Clause for Trust Disputes
clearly intended for it to function under the ICC Rules going forward and to
continue operating under the Rules if they were revised in the future.106 The
101
Spanish Arbitration Act, art. X (2011, 11), available at http://www.tab.es/images/docum
ents/normativa/reforma_ley_60-2003_eng.pdf.
102 See Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 96.
103 See Koch, supra note 92, at 196 (discussing the implications of the wording of the
Spanish Arbitration Act).
104 See id. (discussing how Peru, Honduras, and Bolivia have all followed Spain’s lead).
105
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 387, § 15(2) (Malta), available at http://www.justiceservices.
gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=8854.
106
See supra Part II.A (explaining how the original drafters intended for the Rules to be
interpreted).
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question now becomes whether the changes made to the ICC Rules in the
2012 revision will affect the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate
testamentary disputes going forward. This Note asserts that the revision will
cause an increase in the general enforceability of such agreements, as the
changes made were substantial and relevant to the concerns many courts
expressed with enforcing such agreements. Due to the sparse publication of
opinions from foreign courts regarding this issue, this Note will focus on
how the 2012 revision addressed the concerns U.S. courts had with enforcing
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments.
A. Enforcement Against Nonsignatory Third Parties
One of the rationales courts have relied on when holding agreements to
arbitrate in testamentary instruments unenforceable is based in contract
law.107 The reasoning behind these holdings is that an agreement to arbitrate
is essentially a contract, and courts are hesitant to bind non-signatory third
parties to the terms of contracts unless the third parties are intended
beneficiaries. Theorists argue, and some courts have held, that testamentary
instruments are not contracts, and thus the beneficiaries cannot be bound.108
The argument is that beneficiaries, who are not signatories to the
testamentary instrument, have not received consideration sufficient to imply
an acceptance of the agreement on their part unless they have accepted their
bequests.109 The logical progression of this argument is that, at least in the
U.S., a person’s right to have their day in court is so fundamental that it

107
See Schoneberger v. Oelez, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning that an
agreement to arbitrate in a testamentary instrument is not a contract because of lack of
consideration and consent, an “exchange of promises,” on the part of the beneficiary); id. at
1081 (discussing the argument that non-signatories cannot be bound unless they receive
consideration or a “direct benefit” from the testamentary instrument); In re Calomiris, 894
A.2d 408, 409 (D.C. 2006) (mirrors the sentiment expressed in Schoneberger that an
arbitration clause in a testamentary instrument does not constitute a “written contract or
agreement,” and citing the Schoneberger decision as “instructive”).
108
Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 410 (quoting Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083 (“Arbitration rests
on an exchange of promises. Parties to a contract may decide to exchange promises to
substitute an arbitral for a judicial forum. Their agreement to do so may end up binding (or
benefitting) nonsignatories. In contrast, a trust does not rest on an exchange of promises.”)).
109 See Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1081–82 (discussing that by claiming the benefits of the
testamentary instrument, or of any contract, non-signatory third parties agree to all of the
terms of the contract. The opinion implies that this is a persuasive argument, but goes on to
rule the beneficiaries of the instrument were not bound to arbitrate because the instrument, an
inter vivos trust, was not a written contract.).
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cannot be waived without consideration. There are, however, myriad
arguments that oppose this view.
In his critique of the trend towards enforceability, Stephen Willis Murphy
puts forward three theories upon which courts have enforced such
agreements.110 While all three approaches have merit, only one is relevant
for the purpose of discussing the effects of the revision to the ICC Rules.
By what Murphy calls “benefit theory,”111 courts have enforced
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments by relying on the
rationale that by accepting the benefit conveyed by the instrument,
beneficiaries have received consideration and accepted the terms of the
instrument.112 Murphy criticizes this rationale, however, on the basis that
trustees and executors would not be bound because they have not received
any benefit or consideration.113 Murphy argues that trustees and executors
would be free to resort to litigation to resolve any disputes while
beneficiaries would be bound to rely solely on arbitration.114
The argument that executors have not received consideration, and
therefore that this basis for enforcing arbitration agreements is faulty, is a
moot argument. The primary concern with courts in enforcing these
agreements is that they would be binding a non-signatory third party to a
contract. Executors and trustees are, by definition, signatories to the
testamentary instrument. By consenting to administer the estate of the
decedent by becoming a signatory to the instrument, executors and trustees
have agreed to the entire instrument, including the agreement to arbitrate.
Additionally, many trustees and executors receive a fee for the maintenance
of the trust or estate, and therefore have received monetary payment as
consideration for their agreement to be bound by the testamentary
instrument.
Probate law in the U.S. usually requires beneficiaries to challenge the
validity of a testamentary instrument as a whole and does not allow them to
challenge provisions of the instrument on a piecemeal basis unless they are
110
See generally Murphy, supra note 7, at 660–61 (enumerating three theories on which
enforcement such agreements and then criticizing and refuting each of these theories).
111 Id. at 648–49.
112 See Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1081–82 (citing Am. Bureau of Shipping v. Tencara
Shipyard S.P.A., 170 F.3d 349, 353 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that non-signatories were not
bound by the arbitration agreement without receiving a direct benefit from the agreement.
The case was subsequently overruled by legislative action but this particular aspect of the
holding survived)).
113
Murphy, supra note 7, at 649.
114 Id.

688

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:667

contrary to public policy.115 This presents some beneficiaries with a
quandary: to accept their bequest, and by doing so accept the validity of the
instrument as a whole; or to disclaim their bequest, forgoing their legal right
to it, and challenge the validity of the testamentary instrument as a whole.
Some legal theorists have suggested that as a way to get around the
nonsignatory third party issue the doctrine of separability should apply.116
Under this doctrine, beneficiaries would be able to accept that the
testamentary instrument on the whole is valid and simply challenge the
validity of the arbitration clause. As a logical result, beneficiaries would be
able to receive their bequest, but still be able to challenge the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate. The 2012 ICC Rules revision has an answer to this
argument. The new rules have streamlined the entire process of challenging
the validity of both the instrument and the clause.
The 1998 version of the Rules state that when there is a challenge to the
“existence, validity, or scope”117 of an arbitration clause, the ICC Court may
make a prima facie determination as to the existence of an ICC arbitration
clause.118 This implies the ability to only determine the existence of a clause,
though it’s scope and validity may be challenged. Further, the use of ‘may’
is indicative that such a determination is not a mandatory response to any
challenge. Additionally, the 1998 Rules require the ICC to make the
determination, which would undoubtedly be a lengthy process given the
Court’s caseload.
115 Williams v. Crickman, 405 N.E.2d 799, 803–04 (Ill. 1980) (“[P]art of an instrument may
be declared invalid and the remainder allowed to stand where the invalid portions can be
separated from the instrument as a whole without defeating the intent of the testator. We
agree with plaintiff, for example, that if the contested provisions were fraudulently inserted by
a third party, the court would have the power to deny probate to that provision alone.”
(citations omitted)); Fineman v. Cent. Nat’l Bank of Cleveland, 175 N.E.2d 837, 842 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1961) (“It may be said that many cases hold that invalid conditions precedent to
bequests, especially of personal property, need not be performed, and that the donee takes free
from the condition. Likewise that, if the main purpose was to make a gift to a legatee, but
incidentally to require an act contrary to public policy, such as a divorce, then the gift, in so
far as the unlawful condition is concerned, is unconditional.”). By virtue of the FAA,
arbitration is regarded as in favor of and furthering public policy, and thus would not be
separable from the instrument as a whole.
116 See Horton, supra note 3, at 1082–83 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg.
Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402–04 (1967) (discussing how the doctrine of separability is implied
within the FAA itself. “[T]he Court has interpreted the phrase ‘agreement for arbitration’ in
section 4 to signify the arbitration clause, rather than the ‘container’ contract in which the
arbitration clause appears.”)).
117
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(2).
118 Id.
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The new rules, on the other hand, provide that “[any challenges to] the
existence, validity, or scope of the arbitration agreement . . . shall be decided
directly by the arbitral tribunal.”119 The fact that the drafters specifically
included both “existence” and “validity” is telling. Parties are able to
challenge the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, which is analogous to
challenging the validity of the entire instrument. Clearly, if there is a clause
within the instrument but a party is challenging its existence, the party must
be challenging the validity of the entire will. The additional, but separate
and distinct, ability of parties to challenge the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate is analogous to severing the clause from the rest of the instrument.
In this way, the 2012 Rules address the problem of binding nonsignatories to the agreement to arbitrate regardless of whether they accept
their bequest. A beneficiary is able to challenge the validity of the entire will
by challenging the existence of an included arbitration clause, and still accept
their bequest without agreeing to the validity of the instrument on the whole.
Alternatively, beneficiaries who believe the instrument is valid, and by
accepting their bequests agree to the instrument as a whole, are still able to
challenge the validity of the arbitration clause. However, this does not solve
all the problems. The ICC Rules provide that the Secretariat of the ICC
Court is to determine the existence and validity of the clause.120 This means
that the parties will still have to request a determination from the arbitrating
body before learning whether or not they can litigate. However, this is a
better alternative for beneficiaries than either refusing a bequest and
litigating the validity of the instrument as a whole or accepting a bequest and
being bound by all of the terms of the instrument.
B. The Issue of Process
The second major enforcement issue that courts have with agreements to
arbitrate is that many clauses are either vague or completely silent on many
crucial procedural issues.121 Erin Katzen argues that one of the main
justifications for enforcing arbitration agreements is that it is a cheap and fast
alternative to litigation, the favoring of which reduces the caseload of the
courts.122 Katzen acknowledges this but concludes that the procedural
deficiencies of many arbitration clauses undermine this justification for
119
120
121
122

2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 6(3) (emphasis added).
Id.
Katzen, supra note 2.
Id. at 119.

690

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 43:667

enforcing arbitration agreements because the ambiguity inevitably leads to a
long and costly determination of what the actual terms of the arbitration
agreement are.123 On the other hand, it has been argued that as a result of the
beneficiaries, inability to negotiate any procedural aspects that are specified
in the clause prior to arbitration, many terms that are specified are
substantively unconscionable.124
It is this argument against the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate
testamentary disputes that the 2012 ICC Rules address most directly. Given
the text of the ICC Model Clause, it is clear that on its own it does little to
satisfy any basic requirements for process. However, when read in
conjunction with the underlying rules, the majority of the procedural
deficiencies melt away.
The major procedural concerns within the scope of this Note are the
potential ambiguity in the place of arbitration, the ambiguity in the process of
choosing and appointing arbitrators, and the issue of potential procedural
gaps in the underlying regulatory scheme. Additionally, this Note will
discuss various minor procedural issues that the 2012 Rules revision has also
ameliorated.
1. Place of Arbitration
One of the concerns with regard to the procedural deficiencies of
arbitration rules, and by proxy the clauses that operate under them, is the fact
that the parties may be located in different jurisdictions. It stands to reason
that each would want to compel arbitration in their own locale, and in nontestamentary situations the parties are able to negotiate and decide between
themselves where arbitration will take place during the drafting of the
contract. In a testamentary dispute, however, we have seen that beneficiaries
are non-signatories and thus have no power to negotiate for arbitration to
take place in a favorable forum. The 2012 ICC Rules, however, provide
beneficiaries and all parties to the proceedings an ad hoc ability to influence
the place of arbitration.125
Where the 1998 version of the Rules provide parties requesting arbitration
the opportunity to submit “comments”126 on the place of arbitration, the 2012

123
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Id. at 129.
Id. at 127, 132–35.
2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3).
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(h).
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Rules add the ability to submit “observations or proposals.”127 Testators
may or may not decide to include a forum selection clause as an annex to the
Model Arbitration Clause. In my view, this addition to the Rules solves two
issues.
First, if the agreement to arbitrate does not include a specified forum, the
Secretariat of the ICC Court is able to review the proposals of the parties and
determine the most equitable location for the arbitration proceedings.128
Second, if a location is specified within the testamentary instrument, the
ability to submit proposals allows parties to challenge the unconscionable
nature or reasonableness of that provision. A mirror issue to the concern that
clauses lack a defined location for arbitration proceedings is that if a location
is specified, it may be considered substantively unconscionable to require
one or more of the parties to arbitrate there. A modified provision in the
2012 Rules allows parties to challenge the specified location through their
“observations or proposals.”129 This would allow the Secretariat to
determine whether or not the specified location is reasonable and whether
requiring arbitration to proceed in the stated location would be
unconscionable.
2. Appointment of Arbitrators
Another major procedural concern with enforcing agreements to arbitrate
is that they often do not include rules for appointing arbitrators. On the
unconscionability side of the argument, testators theoretically could provide
for the appointment of specific arbitrators in the testamentary instrument.
The 2012 Rules address both of these concerns through two provisions.
In addition to providing the parties to the proceedings the opportunity to
submit “observations or proposals” for the place of arbitration, the 2012
Rules also allow submissions regarding the number of arbitrators and “any
nomination of an arbitrator” as well.130 The same argument that can be made
that this revision solves the procedural deficiency of an unspecified forum
can be made for the problem of selecting arbitrators. In a situation where no
arbitrators have been specified in the clause or instrument, the parties can
submit their proposals to the Secretariat and expect an equitable result.

127
128
129
130

2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(h) (emphasis added).
Id. arts. 4(3)(h), 18(i).
Id. arts. 4(3)(h), 18(1).
Id. art. 4(3)(g)–(h).
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Unlike the issue of forum selection, where the selection of any given
forum may impose a hardship on one or more parties, the selection of
arbitrators does not. In terms of the potential substantive unconscionability
of appointing an arbitrator specified in the instrument, the 2012 Rules
provide two avenues to challenge that appointment.131
First, parties may submit observations and proposals as to whether or not
the specified arbitrator should be appointed in their initial request for
arbitration.132 The Secretariat has the opportunity to appoint arbitrators
based on those proposals, or to allow the specified arbitrator to go forward
with the proceedings.
If the Secretariat declines to remove the specified arbitrator, the aggrieved
party may still challenge that appointment.133 Parties can challenge the
appointment of an arbitrator by challenging their “impartiality or
independence, or otherwise” via written submission to the Secretariat.134
The Secretariat then has a second chance to review the appointment,
essentially giving parties the ability to appeal a determination that an
appointed arbitrator is appropriate.
The availability of a pseudo-appeal process under the 2012 Rules
addresses concerns about the ambiguity in many arbitration clauses as to who
the arbitrators will be and how they will be chosen. They allow for the
review of all potential appointments for substantive unconscionability.
Because all arbitration clauses operating under the ICC Rules must follow
them, this review process cannot be waived. Thus, it protects both the intent
of the testator if they choose to specify arbitrators as well as the beneficiaries
if those choices were ill advised. It also provides a fallback framework as to
how the parties should appoint arbitrators if the clause and testamentary
instrument do not.
3. Procedural Gaps in the Rules
A third major concern courts and legal theorists have with enforcing
agreements to arbitrate in testamentary disputes is that the underlying
regulatory scheme may contain procedural gaps, as the nonsignatory
beneficiaries are unable to negotiate the terms of the arbitration agreement
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Id. arts. 4(3)(g), 14(1).
Id. art. 4(3)(g).
Id. art. 14(1).
Id. (emphasis added).
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prior to being bound by them.135 An example of this is that where the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide an extensive set of rules governing
discovery,136 the ICC Rules contain only one article divided into six
provisions on the subject.137 This is a major concern for courts because if
parties are bound to arbitrate under a regulatory scheme that is vague as to
the procedural rules that will govern the case, their right to due process may
be offended.
The rules governing the applicable rules of law in an arbitration
proceeding were carried over from the 1998 Rules to the 2012 version
without revision. Article 21 of the 2012 Rules provides that the “parties
shall be free to agree upon the rules of law to be applied by the arbitral
tribunal,”138 and in the absence of any such agreement “the arbitral tribunal
shall apply the rules of law which it [deems] appropriate.”139 The wording of
the provision specifically says “to be applied by the arbitral tribunal to the
merits of the dispute,”140 which arguably can be read as applying this
provision solely to the substantive rules of law of the case. This Note
asserts, however, both the procedural and substantive law of the chosen legal
regime should apply where the ICC Rules and the agreement itself are silent.
Legal commentators have opined that the ICC Rules were intended to rely
on a relevant national legal regime to fill the gaps to begin with. This makes
sense when the multi-national character of the Rules and of the ICC itself is
taken into account. What better way to encourage the adoption and
recognition of their international regulatory scheme than to have the relevant
local legal regime fill any gaps in the Rules? A party could hardly argue that
it had been denied due process when the arbitration proceeded under
substantially the same procedural guidelines that a litigated dispute would
have.

135 See Katzen, supra note 2, at 134–35 (discussing how a “complete set” of mandatory
procedures included in an arbitration regulatory scheme, such as the ICC or AAA Rules,
would be overly onerous. Katzen uses this as a basis for the argument that, as a result,
arbitration rules often contain a multitude of gaps in regulating the procedural elements of the
arbitration.).
136
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37.
137 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 25.
138
Id. art. 21(2). The same provision can be found in the 1998 version of the Rules. See
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 17(i).
139
2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 21(2).
140 Id. (emphasis added).
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4. Minor Procedural Issues Resolved
In addition to addressing the primary concerns many legal theorists and
judges have regarding the enforcement of arbitration agreements in
testamentary instruments, the 2012 Rules contain several provisions that
remedy minor issues relating to the procedural elements of an arbitration
proceeding. Specifically, the 2012 Rules establish provisions that govern
counterclaims,141 the joinder of additional parties,142 the arbitration of claims
between multiple parties to the arbitration,143 and the consolidation of
multiple arbitration proceedings between the same parties.144 While the
resolution of procedural concerns in these areas is unlikely to sway courts
towards enforceability by themselves, when taken in aggregate with the
alleviation of the major concerns I believe the cumulative effect of the 2012
revision will do so.
While the 1998 version of the rules contained a provision relating to
bringing counterclaims, it was ambiguous and did not provide an adequate
framework on how these claims were to be presented.145 The 2012 version
has revised this provision, and sets forth substantially more defined
parameters for asserting a counterclaim. The 2012 Rules require a more
defined assertion of “the amounts of any quantified [counterclaims]
and . . . an estimate of the monetary value of any other counterclaims.”146
The 2012 Rules also provide, in conjunction with the new provisions
regarding the consolidation of claims,147 the ability to assert counterclaims
that arise under more than one arbitration agreement.148 This promotes
efficiency, as parties are now able to arbitrate all of their disputes in one
proceeding instead of being forced to either litigate or participate in multiple
arbitration proceedings.
The joinder provisions included in the 2012 Rules bring the ICC Rules
more in line, procedurally speaking, with the federal legal regime of the U.S.

141

Id. art. 5(5).
See supra note 48.
143 See supra note 50.
144 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 10.
145
1998 RULES, supra note 13, art. 5(v) (states only that counterclaims must be asserted in
the answer to the request for arbitration, include a description of the dispute, and “a statement
of the relief sought”).
146 2012 RULES, supra note 13, art. 4(3)(d).
147
Id. art. 10.
148 Id.
142
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure149 and allow for the joinder of additional
parties subject to certain criteria being met. The 2012 Rules provide that,
upon request of a party and before the appointment of arbitrators, an
additional party may be joined to the proceedings.150 Alternatively,
additional parties may be joined at any time upon the consent of all parties
including the party to be joined.151
While not a crucial procedural issue, in my view, courts will be more
likely to enforce arbitration agreements in testamentary disputes, which often
involve a multitude of parties that potentially receive notice of the
proceedings at varying times, if the parties are afforded essentially the same
procedural tools for joinder that are guaranteed by our federal system.
Furthering the argument that the 2012 revision will bring the ICC Rules
more in line with the procedural guidelines of the United States, and
therefore make their model arbitration clauses more enforceable in the view
of United States courts, is the new provision pertaining to claims between
multiple parties. As we have seen, testamentary disputes often involve a
multitude of parties. This being the case, and given the familial context of
such disputes, there may be more than two sides to the dispute. Where the
1998 Rules did not contain any provision relating to asserting claims against
multiple parties outside of the request for arbitration and the answer,152 the
2012 Rules allow for claims to be asserted “by any party against any other
party.”153 This is a crucial addition to the Rules when the addition of a
joinder provision is taken into account. Under Article 7, it is possible for
parties to be joined to the arbitration after the tribunal has been appointed,
which would mean the request and answer had already been filed with the
Secretariat.154 If parties were unable to assert claims against any other party
outside of the answer to the request, the implication is that parties joined by
consent after the appointment of the arbitrators would essentially be immune
to claims against them by the other parties. Allowing parties to file claims
outside of the request and answer against “any other party”155 brings the
2012 Rules into line with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
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See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 19–20.
See supra note 47.
See supra note 47.
See generally 1998 RULES, supra note 13.
See supra note 50.
See supra note 47.
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provide a litigating party the ability to join “as many claims as it has against
an opposing party.”156
Again, while the resolution of each these minor procedural issues with the
1998 version of the Rules would probably not sway a court from the opinion
the Rules are procedural deficient on their own, when taken in aggregate I
believe the effect is persuasive.
IV. CONCLUSION
While the overall perception of the validity of agreements to arbitrate in
testamentary instruments has historically been that they are unenforceable,
the winds of change are blowing. Under the FAA, arbitration as an
alternative to litigation has become a matter of public policy, and that policy
is to enforce arbitration agreements in order to increase judicial efficiency
and limit the costs of resolving disputes. But the application of this point of
view to arbitration agreements in testamentary instruments has run into
several obstacles. In order to increase the presumptive enforceability of their
model arbitration clauses, including their Model Arbitration Clause for Trust
Disputes, the ICC has made revisions to the set of rules governing its
arbitration proceedings accordingly. This Note has taken the position that
the changes made in 2012 will increase the enforceability of the ICC Model
Clause for Trust Disputes, particularly in the United States.
In almost all other probate situations, the testator’s intent is what governs
the resolution of a dispute. This is not so in the case of agreements to
arbitrate any testamentary disputes. The major concerns that U.S. courts and
legal theorists have expressed regarding the enforcement of these agreements
focus around two major issues: the application of contract law principles to
probate law, and the procedural deficiencies and ambiguities in the
regulatory schemes under which such arbitration clauses operate.
With regard to the concern that application of contract law principles to
arbitration clauses in the probate context will essentially displace probate
law, the 2012 Rules provide a solution. A major issue is that in order to bind
a non-signatory third party to an arbitration agreement, that party must be an
intended beneficiary of the agreement. It cannot be contended that the
beneficiaries of a trust or will are not the intended beneficiaries of said trust
or will. In a commercial contract, the beneficiaries would be bound by the
acceptance of the benefits of the contract, in the probate context this is the
156

FED. R. CIV. P. 18(a).
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bequest. The problem occurs when a beneficiary wishes to accept the
bequest but also wishes to challenge the arbitration agreement.
Probate courts in the United States have long allowed beneficiaries to
receive their bequest and still challenge a restriction on receiving that
bequest as being against public policy (e.g., being able to receive your
bequest on the condition you divorce your wife). It could be argued that an
agreement to arbitrate is a restriction placed on the bequest. Unfortunately
for beneficiaries wishing to avoid arbitration, the FAA resulted in a public
policy of encouraging and enforcing agreements to arbitrate, meaning a
probate court would likely be unwilling to sever the arbitration clause from
the rest of the instrument.
In contract law, the doctrine of separability would apply, and, therefore,
the beneficiary could argue that while the contract as a whole is valid, the
arbitration provision is not. However, courts have consistently ruled that
testamentary instruments are not “contracts” as such between the testator and
the beneficiaries. Therefore, the doctrine of separability, a purely contract
law principle, cannot apply to these disputes and a beneficiary is stuck
making the decision to accept the bequest and submit to arbitration, or to
challenge the validity of the instrument as a whole in probate court.
The 2012 ICC Rules allow parties to challenge the existence of the
arbitration clause, which implies the instrument as a whole considering the
clause is going to be located within the instrument, or to challenge the
validity of said clause. Challenging the validity of the clause is analogous to
severing the clause from the entire instrument, admitting its existence, but
charging that the specific provision of the instrument containing it is invalid.
This would allow courts to refrain from applying a contract principle to
probate law directly, and instead follow the FAA in honoring the agreement
to arbitrate under the prescribed set of rules, in this case the ICC Rules. This
also will solve the dilemma that many beneficiaries may face: to accept a
potentially much needed bequest or to challenge what may be in their minds
a fraudulent or invalid testamentary instrument.
With regard to the concern that there may be procedural deficiencies that
would essentially rob a beneficiary of due process if they were compelled to
arbitrate, the 2012 ICC Rules provide a much more concrete resolution. One
of the main procedural concerns relating to enforcing arbitration agreements,
whether commercial or testamentary, is that often the rules under which the
agreement will operate are either ambiguous, absent, or substantively
unconscionable. In the commercial context, these issues are resolved in the
negotiation stage because both parties have, presumably, relatively equal
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bargaining power and they will be able to include procedural guidelines as
they see necessary. This is unfortunately not the case in testamentary
disputes. There is no bargaining power on the part of the beneficiary, they
simply are named in an instrument and are unable to negotiate for any
procedural safeguards at all.
The 2012 Rules include various provisions governing procedural aspects
of the arbitration, some of which directly address concerns theorists and
judges have put forward as reasons to invalidate agreements to arbitrate
testamentary disputes. Namely, deficiencies in rules governing where an
arbitration will take place, who will be appointed as arbitrators, and, in the
U.S., that there may be underlying gaps in the rules on important procedural
mechanisms such as discovery.
While the 2012 Rules do not specifically address these issues in the sense
that they do not lay out exactly where arbitration will take place and who
will be appointed, they do create an appellate-like process for those
decisions. Under the 2012 Rules, parties can submit observations or
proposals on nearly every procedural aspect of an arbitration proceeding to
the Secretariat of the ICC Court in either the request for arbitration or the
answer to the request. Therefore, if an arbitration agreement does not
specify a location or a list of potential, or specific, arbitrators, the parties are
able to submit their proposals to the ICC Court and expect an equitable
result. On the other hand, if the arbitration agreement does set out these
procedural elements with specificity, parties may still submit their
observations and proposals. If, based on those proposals, the Secretariat
finds them to be unconscionable, it will be able to modify the provisions of
the agreement so as to make them equitable.
The ICC Rules are also intended to function with a reliance on domestic
law to cover any gaps. While this is not an effect of the 2012 revision, it
does address the concern that the Rules themselves are under-inclusive in
terms of procedural safeguards. It cannot be argued that a party has been
denied due process due to a deficiency in the underlying rules if, when
compelled to arbitrate, it is protected by the procedural safeguards it would
have been entitled to if it had gone to litigation.
While the main concerns may not have been completely resolved by the
revision, the question posed in this Note is whether or not the 2012 revision
has increased the enforceability of the Clause. My answer is yes. Overall,
given the current trend in U.S. law and public policy towards the
enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in testamentary instruments, I
believe the enforcement of the ICC Model Arbitration Clause for Trust
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Disputes will increase in the aggregate. The 2012 revision a addressed the
major concerns courts have expressed with enforcing these clauses, as well
as some of those posed by legal theorists upon which courts have not opined.
Given how recent the revisions were, their true effect will most likely not be
visible for several years. In terms of enforceability, I believe the only way to
go is up.

